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Cost/Benefit of Litigation in Fishery Management
Where the Rubber Meets the Road:
Stakeholders and the Take Reduction Teams of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act
Suzanne Iudicello69
In my opinion, the presentations this morning have been quite
pessimistic. We have talked a lot about conflict. Yes, I am a lawyer, and
yes I did participate in the Kokechik case,7 ° which was one of the first cases
that opened up the notion that interactions between protected species and
fisheries was an area that had to be paid attention. Nonetheless, I do
believe in the old style of conflict resolution and really do yearn for those
safe, civic places where people can talk about problem-solving. That is
what I am going to touch on in my presentation.
As I go into the material, I would like to acknowledge the contribution
of my colleague, Nina Young, of the Ocean Conservancy, who was co-
author of a law review article7' with me on which this talk is based in part,
and who helped me get up-to-date on the marine mammal take reduction
teams.
I would like to describe to you what the take reduction teams are. Take
reduction teams were created under the Marine Mammal Protection Act 72
amendments of 1994. I would like to walk you through them with four
questions in mind. So let us keep these questions in our heads as you hear
all these details about dates and people that I am going to talk about.
" What was successful about the take reduction team process?
" Did those teams provide an alternative to litigation?
" What did not work about them?
* Can that process be applied in other marine resource conflicts?
69. Independent consultant, Junkyard Dogfish Consulting, and writer on fisheries
issues, who participated in the litigation in 1987 that began the examination of interactions
between fisheries and marine mammals under the Marine Mammal Protection Act. See note
70.
70. Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004 (1989).
71. Nina M. Young & Suzanne Iudicello, Blueprint for Whale Conservation:
Implementing the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 149 (1997)
(discussing the implementation of the MMPA's incidental take provisions); see also Nina
M. Young, The Conservation of Marine Mammals Using a Multi-Party Approach: An
Evaluation of the Take Reduction Team Process, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 293 (2001).
72. 16 U.S.C. 1361-1407 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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Are take reduction teams a possible solution? We are all talking this
morning about how we wish we could find an answer to conflict and an
alternative to litigation. Do these teams give us one possibility?
I will begin with a little background. The MMPA was one of those
command and control laws that was passed in the fervor of the environmen-
tal movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The premise was that
marine mammals are species of special concern that need to be protected.
Marine mammal numbers were declining, and Congress saw fit to stop that
by setting in place a policy that basically declared you could not kill marine
mammals, unless you were allowed to by a series of permits and applica-
tions.
The MMPA was amended in 1988 and again in 1994. The reason for
considerable attention by the fishing organizations, environmental groups,
and NMFS was that fishing operations were taking marine mammals in the
course of their work. The first big example was the Japanese driftnet fleet
for salmon that operated in the U.S. EEZ into the 1970s and 1980s. That
fishery was shut down for a short period of time over marine mammal
issues. The Kokechik case brought fishermen and environmentalists to the
table to figure out what was going to be done with the fishery. It was fine
when Alaska fishermen and national environmental groups were together
filing a lawsuit against the Japanese over our salmon, but now U.S.
fishermen were going to take marine mammals and we were going to get
shut down. So we attempted to figure out what we could do about it.
My colleagues earlier today described that litigation can have some
benefits. It is a tool akin to the two-by-four the muleskinner uses to wop
the mule up the side of its head to get its attention. Then you can lead the
mule down the road. I would not agree though with Mr. Tienson that once
you wop the mule over the head that the door is then open for trust and
communication. I think the mule probably hates your guts, though he still
might follow you down the road.
In any case, there were some changes in 1988 to the MMPA creating
an interim exemption program where fishermen were allowed to have
incidental takes of marine mammals, but provisions in the law called for a
subsequent plan on how takes were going to be reduced. That brings us to
the 1994 amendments. The premise of the 1994 amendments was that
allowing incidental takes in fishing was going to be based on the status of
the marine mammal population. This involved finding out the status and
trend of a species, what the fishing operation was doing, determining which
fisheries were interacting with marine mammals, how many they were
taking, what were the biological limits, and how many could be taken
incidentally in the course of fishing before such takes really affected what
was going on with the population. Those 1994 amendments were
developed out of a recommendation that was a joint proposal negotiated
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between fishing groups and environmental groups. These groups sat at
many, many tables for months and months with a formal facilitation
process, and they devised a proposal that they took to Congress and that
was enacted into law with modifications.
The section of the law that bears most on this discussion today was one
that created a process for planning to reduce incidental takes of marine
mammals in fisheries over time.73 The planners were to be fishermen,
environmental groups, academics, scientists, agency managers, gear
experts, and any other interested parties. These teams were to develop a
plan for each stock that was a strategic stock. A strategic stock meant that
there was a human-caused mortality that was significant to the population,
that there was fishing mortality as a subset of the human-caused mortality,
and that the injury and mortality were both significant. The plans were
anticipated to include both regulatory and non-regulatory measures, so they
could have voluntary ideas, rules, and research ideas. There was a lot of
flexibility.
The one thing that was not flexible was how fast this had to get done.
There was a six-month deadline by which the takes of marine mammals
had to be below what was termed potential biological removal (PBR). PBR
is a calculated number that says you can take up to a certain number and
not have an adverse effect. Incidental takes in fishing operations had to be
below that PBR within six months.
The idea was that the take reduction teams would come up with a
consensus proposal. That proposal would go in draft to NMFS, which
would then publish the draft plan and some proposed regulations to
implement it in the Federal Register. There would be a period of public
comment, the proposal would be put in final form, and the plans would then
go into operation on the fishing grounds. Ideally, we anticipated seeing
quick reductions of these interactions.
The agency convened six teams in the period between 1996 and 1997.
The teams were: (1) Pacific Offshore Cetaceans; (2) Atlantic Offshore
Cetaceans; (3) Gulf of Maine harbor porpoise; (4) Mid-Atlantic harbor
porpoise; (5) Atlantic large whale, and that last one has not been convened,
so we will not talk about it just yet.
These five teams were to be convened and operated with the help of a
professional facilitator, who was contracted to pull together lists of people
who could participate. NMFS always had representatives on the teams.
The teams met five to eight times over a six-month period. You can see
[referring to transparency] that a lot of this was going on simultaneously
and for many of the fishing groups and environmental groups, sometimes
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1387.
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the same person was participating. This resulted in a tremendous personal
commitment for individual stakeholders and for the agency, too. You really
had to make a huge commitment of time to participate, and the stakeholders
did their work.
The cost was not just personal in terms of the time commitment of the
participants. The agency had to prepare marine mammal stock assessments.
They had to make status determinations. They had to provide all this
information to the teams, as well as, convene the teams and pay the
facilitators and so on. This process cost about $5 million a year. It was not
cheap.
As you can see [referring to transparency] the teams pretty much did
their job in the six-month time period. They came up with a host of
practical methods to reduce their interactions and harm to marine mammals.
I am not going to go through all of them here because we do not have that
much time, but the ideas that the fishermen, the gear people, the environ-
mental advocates, and everybody else came up with ranged from pingers,
which are devices that are put on nets that send out a sound that deters
marine mammals away from nets, to closures of which some were seasonal
and sometimes related to passage of the animals, such as during whale
migrations. Some of the teams even came up with ideas that related to the
structure of the fishery. For example, the Atlantic Offshore Cetaceans team
decided that the biggest problem they had was overcapitalization of the
fishery and that they just needed to reduce effort. If they had fewer boats
out there, they would be having fewer incidental takes of marine mammals.
Most of the plans were implemented at least in part. The Pacific
Offshore Cetacean team hit below the PBR target right away. In New
England, where the takes of harbor porpoise had environmentalists on the
brink of litigation for years due to the critically endangered status of harbor
porpoise, the take has been below PBR for two consecutive years now. The
latest stock assessment for harbor porpoise shows that there are more
animals, and that the take is going to be below PBR again, which is great
news.
One of the plans that I thought was the most interesting was one that
developed when the Mid-Atlantic harbor porpoise team and the New
England harbor-porpoise team started looking jointly at their respective
ideas. The fishermen in the Mid-Atlantic had been telling NMFS and the
take reduction teams that incidental takes of marine manals did not occur
within their fisheries. Observer data were showing dead harbor porpoise,
and it turned out that the way fishermen in Virginia geared up, namely the
kind of twine they used for their mesh, the size of their mesh, where they
deployed, the time of day they deployed, and how they hauled back were
not taking marine mammals. However, when their brethren came down
from New England and started fishing in coastal waters off the Mid-
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Atlantic, the way the New England fisherman geared up was taking marine
mammals in significant numbers. As a result, a plan was devised for the
Mid-Atlantic area that captured the old notion "when in Rome, do as the
Romans do." The final plan that came out integrated a whole menu of
options that incorporated fishing practices from the Mid-Atlantic with the
direction that if you are going to fish off the coast of Virginia, employ these
operational practices, and you will not have a marine mammal problem.
Today, this plan has been a success.
Are there any lessons for us to learn from the take reduction teams?
What was successful about the process? The first and most obvious thing
is that the take reduction team process worked. Takes of marine mammals
in fishing operations are below PBR in every plan operating fisheries here
except the one where the agency disbanded the team and did not implement
the plan, which is another story altogether.
Besides that obvious success, the stakeholder participants found a lot
to like about the system. NMFS contracted for an evaluation by the
facilitators of the process, and overall the participants felt that they could
express their views, that they had a venue for exchanging information, and
that even when they did not reach consensus they thought the process was
worthwhile simply because they had an opportunity to express their ideas
and talk to their colleagues and adversaries.
Another positive outcome of the team approach was that it fostered
ingenuity. The practical problem-solving atmosphere that was created in
the take reduction teams made room for ideas that could be discussed
among the fishermen, the gear experts, the conservation advocates, and the
managers. The Mid-Atlantic harbor porpoise take reduction team is an
excellent example of this ingenuity. There were other areas that proved to
be creative problem solvers as well. In the Pacific Offshore Cetacean team,
for example, the team tried their first experiment with pingers, which was
very successful, but then they figured out the way they were deploying the
pingers was dangerous to the fishermen and that a different head-rope
length was necessary. The team met again and modified the pinger
specifications. The take reduction team process is a very interactive
process, and all the take reduction teams continue to talk on a regular basis.
Did the take reduction teams provide an alternative to litigation? Yes
and no. Conservation groups sued in 1998 to compel NMFS to implement
the plans that the Gulf of Maine and Mid-Atlantic harbor porpoise teams
actually submitted.74 Those advocates would argue that they sued to
implement what the parties agreed to and, in fact, were supporting the
74. Plaintiff's Complaint, Center for Marine Conservation v. Daley (D.D.C. 1998) (Civ.
No. 1:98CV02029 EGS).
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process. Litigation in and of itself can be very threatening to people and it
has, according to some folks I have talked to, created some mistrust and
eroded the relationships that they had built over the course of the team
deliberations.
In the case of northern right whales, on the other hand, conservation
groups maintain that if the take reduction team had not existed as a venue
to discuss how to reduce fishing-caused mortality of these critically
endangered whales, they would undoubtedly have taken the agency to court
under the ESA not the MMPA. Now the Atlantic large whale team is
moving ahead with discussions. They have got some measures in place,
and they are working on critical habitat issues and gear testing, in addition
to pushing the use of nets with weak links, which allow for whales to pass
through. They are testing these weak links nets to see how far they can go.
So in some cases the take reduction team process did stop litigation, while
in other cases it did not.
So what did not work? What do we want to continue from the take
reduction teams? The survey of the participants conducted by RESOLVE,
Incorporated, who was the facilitator for the meetings and conducted the
survey, offers information on process design, participant selection, timing,
and preparation for the meetings. I would suggest it is a good resource for
anyone who is looking to follow this model.
The most significant problem that participants cited is the disconnec-
tion between the teams and the agency. NMFS had the six- month statutory
deadline to meet. This deadline was too short to both learn about the issues
and reach consensus. The teams worked as fast as they could, then they
gave their plan to NMFS, and sometimes it was a year or possibly two years
before the agency acted on the plans by which time other events had
overtaken the plans.
The most disruptive case of this was the Atlantic Offshore Cetacean
team whose recommendations were made irrelevant by the discontinuation
of the very fisheries they were working on: the pair trawl and driftnet
fisheries for swordfish. So from the standpoint of the fishing industry and
the conservation community that decision obviated the process and made
them very reluctant to come back again and participate in something where
they did not think their work was going to be used. An environmentalist
participant noted that NMFS had forced the group to litigate on the
environmental side.
So can the take reduction team process be applied in other marine
resource conflicts? It might be too soon to tell, but the Pacific Offshore
Cetacean team, which is held out by many as the definitive model, gives us
reason to look for opportunities. Not only did the Pacific Offshore
Cetacean team reach its objective, they also voluntarily took on another
resource conflict issue by looking at marine turtle problems. At its last
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meeting this year, the Pacific Offshore Cetacean team was examining how
to integrate what is being done under the MMPA with what is required
under the Magnuson Act to open the fishery and what is required under the
ESA to protect marine turtles. They are making recommendations to
NMFS on how to develop reasonable and prudent alternatives under the
ESA that were actually developed under the take reduction team's open
discussion, give-and-take process. If this model is to be applied success-
fully in other conflicts, we have to make some improvements. I look
forward to discussing during the panel what those might be.
